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Abstract
We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose
preferences are additively separable. If consumers have identical discount factors,
then allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation-
proof. In an economy with a sequence of markets, competitive equilibria are
Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic endowments, only if preferences are
locally homothetic.
JEL classification: D51; D60; D91
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1. Introduction
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in models in which consumers have present-
biased time-inconsistent preferences. This interest is motivated in part by introspec-
tion, by experiments, and by the possibility that certain types of behavior can be more
easily understood using such preferences.1
Much of the literature has relied on additively separable preferences with identi-
cal subjective discount factors and homothetic utility functions.2 As is the case when
preferences are time consistent, this means that the distribution of wealth does not
affect equilibrium prices when markets are complete. This paper points out that there
is an additional implication that is not expected, not robust, and therefore potentially
misleading. The implication is that the competitive equilibrium of an exchange econ-
omy with a sequence of markets is Pareto efficient from the perspective of consumers
making decisions at any given point in time.
This efficiency result is unexpected because the classic proof of the First Welfare
Theorem fails. In an economy with a sequence of markets, consumer choices are taken
to be the outcome of an intrapersonal game. A decision maker at a point in time is
not in full control of the consumption sequence selected in equilibrium from the budget
set, and so a Pareto improvement may well be budget feasible at equilibrium prices, for
every consumer in the economy. It is easy to construct explicit examples in which the
efficiency result fails when consumers discount future utilities differently.3 We show
that, even when consumers discount future utilities in the same way, homotheticity
is also in essence necessary for the efficiency result. When preferences are not locally
homothetic, competitive equilibria are inefficient for generic endowments.
The underlying reason for the special role of homotheticity stems from the fact
that time-inconsistency distorts intertemporal marginal rates of substitution by a fac-
tor that depends on marginal propensities to consume out of next-period wealth. The
linear consumption function implied by identical homothetic preferences ensures that
this distortion is the same across consumers. This guarantees efficiency. But when
1Strotz [16] and Phelps and Pollak [13] initiated the study of additively separable preferences that
exhibit time-inconsistency. Laibson [8] pointed to the role of partially illiquid assets in providing
commitment to consumers with time-inconsistent preferences.
2Equilibrium models that make essential use of homotheticity include Barro [2], Kocherlakota [6],
Krusell, Kurus¸c¸u and Smith [7], and Luttmer and Mariotti [9].
3Consider for example an economy with a time-consistent consumer and a time-inconsistent con-
sumer who both have log utility.
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consumers do not have the same homothetic preferences, marginal propensities to con-
sume out of next-period wealth typically differ across consumers. In turn this causes
marginal rates of consumption between current and next-period consumption to differ
across consumers. The resulting allocation of resources will be inefficient.
2. Efficiency in an exchange economy
2.1. The economy
We consider a three-period exchange economy with a finite number I of consumer types.
There is a continuum of consumers of each type, and for notational simplicity we take
each of these continua to be of unit measure. A single good is available for consumption
in every period. A consumer of type i has positive endowments eit of this good in period
t, and aggregate endowments in this period are denoted by et. A consumer of type i
has preferences over non-negative consumption sequences ci = (ci1, c
i
2, c
i
3) given by:
U i1(c
i) = ui(ci1) + δ1u
i(ci2) + δ2u
i(ci3)
in period 1, and by:
U i2(c
i) = ui(ci2) + δ1u
i(ci3)
in period 2. The subjective discount factors δ1 and δ2 are positive, and the period utility
functions ui : R+ → R ∪ {−∞} are assumed to be strictly increasing, continuous, and
strictly concave. These preferences are time-inconsistent whenever δ21 6= δ2, with a bias
toward the present if δ21 < δ2. Note that, although the period utility functions u
i may
vary across consumer types, we take the discount factors δ1 and δ2 to be the same for
all consumer types.
2.2. Efficient allocations
A symmetric allocation in this economy is a vector c ∈ R3I+ of consumption sequences,
one for each consumer type.4 An allocation is feasible if aggregate consumption in
every period does not exceed aggregate endowments. Because preferences may change
over time, several notions of efficiency can be useful.
Definition 1. A feasible allocation c is:
4Our efficiency concepts can be easily extended to asymmetric allocations. However, because the
ui are strictly concave, such allocations can never be efficient in any of the senses defined below.
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(i) Date-t Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible allocation c˜ such that U it (c˜
i) ≥
U it (c
i) for all i, with a strict inequality for at least one i.
(ii) Renegotiation-proof if it is date-2 Pareto efficient and there is no other date-
2 Pareto efficient allocation c˜ such that U i1(c˜
i) ≥ U i1(ci) for all i, with a strict
inequality for at least one i.
Date-1 efficiency is the natural notion of efficiency when consumers can commit ex
ante to a sequence of consumption choices. When this is not the case, renegotiation-
proof allocations correspond to a notion of constrained efficiency: these allocations
are efficient when evaluated using date-1 preferences, subject to the constraint that
the implied date-2 allocations are efficient when evaluated using date-2 preferences. It
turns out that this constraint does not bind when all consumers discount future utilities
in the same way.
Proposition 1. When consumers have identical discount factors, the sets of date-1
Pareto efficient and of renegotiation-proof allocations coincide.
Proof. Let e = (e1, e2, e3), and consider the set U1,
U1 =
{
U1 ∈ RI : U1 ≤ (U11 (c1), . . . , U I1 (cI)) for some c ∈ R3I+ such that
I∑
i=1
ci ≤ e
}
.
Because the aggregate resource constraint is convex and the utility functions U i1 are
concave and continuous, U1 is a closed and convex set. Date-1 Pareto efficiency of an
allocation c ∈ R3I+ implies that c belongs to the boundary of U1. By the Separating
Hyperplane Theorem, there exists a λ ∈ RI \ {0} such that λ · U1(c) ≥ λ · U1 for all
U1 ∈ U1, and, since U1 − RI+ ⊂ U1, we must have λ ≥ 0. In particular, c solves:
max
c∈R3I+
{
I∑
i=1
λiU i1(c
i) :
I∑
i=1
ci ≤ e
}
. (1)
Since the resource constraints are independent across time and preferences are addi-
tively separable, and since the discount factors δ1 and δ2 are the same across consumers,
the solution to (1) can be obtained by solving:
max
ct∈RI+
{
I∑
i=1
λiui(cit) :
I∑
i=1
cit ≤ et
}
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for all t. This in turn implies that c solves:
max
c∈R3I+
{
I∑
i=1
λiU i2(c
i) :
I∑
i=1
ci ≤ e
}
.
Therefore, since λ ≥ 0 and λ 6= 0, there exists no feasible allocation c˜ such that U i2(c˜i) >
U i2(c
i) for all i. Using the fact that the ui are continuous and strictly increasing, one
can verify that this implies that c is date-2 Pareto efficient. ¤
This result says that full efficiency and constrained efficiency impose the same re-
strictions on allocations, provided consumers have identical discount factors. This
justifies our use of date-1 Pareto efficiency as our efficiency concept in Section 4. It
is straightforward to extend this result to multi-period economies in which consumers
of type i have preferences in period t given by
∑T−t
n=0 δnu
i(cit+n), with T possibly infi-
nite. Proposition 1 also holds under uncertainty if preferences after every history can
be represented by an expected utility function using subjective probabilities that are
updated using Bayes’ rule.5
2.3. Different discount factors
Things change when consumers have discount factors δi1 and δ
i
2 that are not the same
for all i. Let c(λ) be a date-1 Pareto efficient allocation given a vector of Pareto weights
λ for date-1 utilities. That is, c(λ) solves:
max
c∈R3I+
{
I∑
i=1
λi
[
ui(ci1) + δ
i
1u
i(ci2) + δ
i
2u
i(ci3)
]
:
I∑
i=1
ci ≤ e
}
. (2)
For c(λ) to remain Pareto efficient at date 2, it must be that (c2(λ), c3(λ)) solves:
max
(c2,c3)∈R2I++
{
I∑
i=1
µi
[
ui(ci2) + δ
i
1u
i(ci3)
]
:
I∑
i=1
(ci2, c
i
3) ≤ (e2, e3)
}
(3)
for some vector of Pareto weights µ. Using (2)–(3) together with the fact that there is a
one-to-one relationship between efficient allocations and Pareto weights, it is not diffi-
cult to check that the only circumstance in which this will be the case is when the ratio
δi2/(δ
i
1)
2 is constant across consumers. This is automatically satisfied if consumers have
5An axiomatic foundation of such preferences can proceed mostly along the usual lines. To allow
for time-inconsistency and still obtain subjective probabilities that satisfy Bayes’ rule, one has to
assume that preferences are consistent across information sets.
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time-consistent preferences. When this is not the case, this ratio can be interpreted as
a measure of the consumers’ time-inconsistency. Thus date-1 Pareto efficient alloca-
tions are renegotiation-proof if and only if all consumers exhibit the same degree of
time-inconsistency: when their discount factors are given by βδi and β(δi)2 for some
common time-inconsistency parameter β. In multi-period economies, this generalizes
to the requirement that the discount factors of a type-i consumer are given by β1δ
i,
β2(δ
i)2, β3(δ
i)3, . . . , for all i.
3. Competitive equilibria in economies with a sequence of markets
The Second Welfare Theorem implies that date-1 efficient allocations can be imple-
mented using competitive markets in which trade in one- and two-period bonds takes
place only at date 1. When preferences are time-consistent, one can use this to con-
struct an equivalent equilibrium for an economy with a sequence of markets in which
consumers can trade in one-period bonds (Arrow [1]). A consumption plan that is
feasible in one economy is feasible in the other, and time-consistency ensures that
consumers who make plans at one date will not want to revise them at a later date.
This last observation is no longer true when preferences are time-inconsistent, and we
therefore need to study economies with a sequence of markets separately.
3.1. Markets
We consider the following market structure. Consumers trade in markets for one-period
discount bonds at dates 1 and 2. They face no constraints on borrowing, other than
that they must be able to pay off their debts at date 3. The sequence of bond markets
allows consumers to exchange consumption at any one date for consumption at any
other date. The price of date-t consumption in terms of some numeraire is denoted by
pt and thus the price in terms of date-t consumption of a bond that pays one unit of
consumption at date t+ 1 is simply pt+1/pt. We let p = (p1, p2, p3) and normalize p so
that it belongs to the unit simplex ∆3 of R3++.
Following Pollak [14] and Peleg and Yaari [12], we view each individual consumer
as composed of a sequence of autonomous decision makers, indexed by time. We refer
to the decision maker at date t as the “date-t consumer.” Taking prices as given,
a trading strategy for the date-t consumer is a decision how much to consume and
save given any history at date t. For any given individual consumer, we require these
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trading strategies to form a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal game
played between the corresponding date-1, -2 and -3 consumers.
3.2. The date-2 exchange economy
At date 3, a typical consumer simply consumes his or her wealth, which consists of
endowments and maturing bonds. At date 2, the same consumer chooses how much
to consume and how many bonds to buy. Given wealth w2 ≥ 0 and prices p ∈ ∆3, a
date-2 consumer of type i solves:
max
(c2,c3)∈R2+
{
ui(c2) + δ1u
i(c3) : p2c2 + p3c3 ≤ p2w2
}
. (4)
Let ci2(p, w2) and c
i
3(p, w2) be the decision rules that solve (4) for various prices p and
wealth levels w2. The utility perceived by the date-1 consumer from these choices is
captured by a value function V i defined by:
V i(p, w2) = δ1u
i(ci2(p, w2)) + δ2u
i(ci3(p, w2)).
For given prices p, there is no guarantee that this value function will be concave in date-
2 wealth w2 if preferences are not time-consistent.
6 This may give a date-1 consumer
an incentive to trade in lotteries (Luttmer and Mariotti [10]). In the absence of lottery
markets, the non-concavity of V i(p, ·) can cause the set of optimal consumption and
savings choices of a date-1 consumer to be non-convex.
3.3. Competitive equilibrium
By trading in one-period bonds, a date-1 consumer of type i with wealth w1 can choose
levels of date-1 consumption and date-2 wealth that solve:
max
(c1,w2)∈R2+
{
ui(c1) + V
i(p, w2) : p1c1 + p2w2 ≤ p1w1
}
. (5)
The set of solutions to this decision problem is denoted by [ci1, w
i
2](p, w1). For any price
vector p ∈ ∆3, let wi1(p) denote date-1 wealth of a consumer of type i:
wi1(p) =
1
p1
3∑
t=1
pte
i
t. (6)
6Morris [11] shows that in the case of present bias (δ2 > δ21) the value function V
i(p, ·) is concave
if δ1p2 ≤ (≥)p3 and the absolute risk tolerance of ui is convex (concave).
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Given prices p and date-1 choices (c1, w2), the consumption allocation of a consumer
of type i is given by di(p, c1, w2) = (c1, c
i
2(p, w2), c
i
3(p, w2))
′. By combining the solution
to (5) with (6) one can construct the demand correspondence of a consumer of type i:
Di(p) = di(p, [ci1, w
i
2](p, w
i
1(p))).
By construction, a date-1 consumer of type i will be indifferent between all points in
Di(p). Because there is a continuum of unit measure of such consumers, their aggregate
demand is given by the convex hull coDi(p). A point in coDi(p) that is not an extreme
point is obtained by having appropriate fractions of type-i consumers choose points in
Di(p). A competitive equilibrium is given by prices p such that:
0 ∈
I∑
i=1
[
coDi(p)− ei].
We can now prove the following result.
Proposition 2. A competitive equilibrium exists.
The proof can be constructed using Debreu’s [3] excess demand approach. The main
difficulty consists in showing that if {pn} is a sequence of prices that converges to the
boundary of ∆3, then, for each i, the sequence {infz∈Di(pn) ‖z‖} goes to infinity. That
this boundary property holds is not a priori obvious because Di is not the outcome of
a decision problem when consumers of type i have time-inconsistent preferences. We
refer to Luttmer and Mariotti [10] for details.
4. Smooth preferences
Under what circumstances will the competitive equilibria shown to exist in Proposition
2 be Pareto efficient at the initial date? Clearly, date-1 Pareto efficiency does not hold
for asymmetric equilibria in which the non-convexity of the demand correspondence
means that consumers of the same type must choose different allocations. If the util-
ity functions ui are sufficiently smooth, then more can be said about the efficiency
properties of symmetric competitive equilibria. We therefore introduce the following
assumption.
Assumption S. The utility functions ui have continuous derivatives up to any order
on R++, and limc↓0Dui(c) = +∞.
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4.1. Efficient allocations
Suppose Assumption S holds. Given a vector of aggregate endowments e, the set of
interior date-1 Pareto efficient allocations is then given by those c ∈ R3I++ that for some
λ ∈ RI++ and p ∈ R3++ satisfy the marginal conditions:
λiDui(cit) = pt (7)
and feasibility conditions:
I∑
i=1
cit = et, (8)
for all i and t. We can take λ to be in the unit simplex ∆I of RI++. Let P be the set
of pairs (e, c) of aggregate endowments and consumption allocations that satisfy (7)–
(8). In the Appendix we show that P is a (I + 2)-dimensional manifold. Thus, given
aggregate endowments, the manifold of Pareto efficient allocations is, as expected, of
dimension I − 1.
4.2. Equilibrium allocations
Fix some price vector p ∈ ∆3. Under Assumption S, the decisions of a date-2 consumer
of type i with positive wealth w2 are fully characterized by the date-2 budget constraint
and the usual first-order condition:
p3
p2
=
δ1Du
i(ci3(p, w2))
Dui(ci2(p, w2))
. (9)
Moreover, for a fixed p, the decision rules ci2(p, ·) and ci3(p, ·) are differentiable functions
of wealth. By differentiating (9) and the date-2 budget constraint with respect to w2
one can verify that DwV
i(p, w2) must be given by:
DwV
i(p, w2) = f
i(ci2(p, w2), c
i
3(p, w2))Du
i(ci2(p, w2)), (10)
where the function fi is defined by:
f i(x, y) =
δ1
[Dui(x)]2
D2ui(x)
+ δ2
[Dui(y)]2
D2ui(y)
[Dui(x)]2
D2ui(x)
+ δ1
[Dui(y)]2
D2ui(y)
.
Note that in the case of time-consistent preferences, this expression reduces to δ1, as
expected from (10) and the envelope condition for (4). The consumption and wealth
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choices of a date-1 consumer of type i with positive wealth w1 must satisfy the date-1
budget constraint and the usual first-order condition:
p2
p1
=
DwV
i(p, w2)
Dui(ci1(p, w1))
. (11)
Any feasible consumption allocation that satisfies (9)–(11) for all consumers i and some
prices p is a candidate for a symmetric competitive equilibrium allocation. Alterna-
tively, given aggregate endowments e, a feasible allocation c that is part of a competitive
equilibrium must for some λ ∈ ∆I and p ∈ R3++ satisfy:
λi
 Dui(ci1)f i(ci2, ci3)Dui(ci2)
f i(ci2, c
i
3)Du
i(ci3)
= p (12)
for all i. Because the first-order conditions (11) need not be sufficient, some of the
feasible allocations admitted by (12) may not correspond to an equilibrium. The col-
lection of (e, c) such that c is a symmetric competitive equilibrium allocation given
aggregate endowments e is contained in a manifold of dimension I + 2.
4.3. Efficient equilibria are non-generic
A comparison of (7) and (12) shows that competitive equilibria are efficient if and only
if the f i(ci2, c
i
3) are the same across consumers. By adding this restriction to the con-
ditions (7)–(8) for efficiency, we can determine which of the efficient allocations could
potentially be decentralized as equilibrium allocations. From now on, we shall assume
that preferences are time-inconsistent. It then follows from (7) and the definition of f i
that adding the restriction that the f i(ci2, c
i
3) coincide to the definition of an efficient
allocation is equivalent to adding the requirement that for some ξ > 0 and all i:
D2ui(ci3)
D2ui(ci2)
= ξ. (13)
Relative to the definition of P , this adds I additional restrictions and the new variable
ξ. Since P is an (I + 2)-dimensional manifold, this suggests that the set of aggregate
endowments and efficient equilibrium allocations is 3-dimensional. For given aggre-
gate endowments, this would imply that there are only isolated points at which the
equilibrium and efficient allocations coincide.
Whether or not this is indeed the case depends on whether the equations (13) are
locally independent of the efficiency conditions (7)–(8). The following three examples
show why this need not be true.
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Example 1. If ui(c) = (c1−ρ−1)/(1−ρ) for some ρ > 0 and all i, then (13) is implied
by the efficiency conditions (7)–(8). This implies that competitive equilibria are in fact
efficient. For these preferences, the fact that the Dui(ci3)/Du
i(ci2) are the same across
consumers implies that consumption growth between dates 2 and 3 is the same for all
consumers. In turn, this implies that the D2ui(ci3)/D
2ui(ci2) are also the same across
consumers, which makes (13) redundant. Thus, in particular, the linear competitive
equilibrium studied in Luttmer and Mariotti [9] is efficient.
Example 2. Consider arbitrary utility functions ui but suppose that e2 = e3. Then
efficiency in the 2-period exchange economy that starts at date 2 requires that ci2 = c
i
3
for all consumers. Constant consumption across dates 2 and 3 for all consumers again
makes (13) redundant.
Example 3. Suppose consumers are identical and have identical endowments. Then
any symmetric equilibrium would clearly be efficient, although one need not necessarily
exist.
Our main result shows that these examples of efficiency are special, either because
of homotheticity, or because of non-generic endowments. Specifically, if preferences are
nowhere locally homothetic, then condition (13) will, for generic endowments, be inde-
pendent of the efficiency conditions (7)–(8), and a symmetric competitive equilibrium
will not be date-1 Pareto efficient.
We will say that preferences are locally homothetic if the ratio:
si(x) =
D3ui(x)Dui(x)
[D2ui(x)]2
is constant over some range. That is, preferences exhibit locally linear risk tolerance
Dui(x)/D2ui(x). Our next assumption precisely rules out this case.7
Assumption Z. The utility functions ui are such that Dsi is zero on a closed set of
measure zero.
This gives rise to the following result.
7A weaker version of Assumption Z would require that the set of points at which Dsi vanishes is
nowhere dense in R++. The results derived below hold under this alternative assumption provided
“measure zero” is replaced by “nowhere dense and closed” in all the statements below.
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Proposition 3. Under Assumptions S and Z, the set of date-1 Pareto efficient allo-
cations and the set of equilibrium allocations intersect only at isolated points, except
for economies with aggregate endowments in a closed set of measure zero.
Because the set of date-1 Pareto efficient allocations and the set of renegotiation-
proof allocations coincide when consumers have identical discount factors, Proposition 3
can be interpreted as a constrained inefficiency result. The importance of homotheticity
is easy to understand. Specifically, (11) can be expressed using the marginal propensity
to consume out of date-2 wealth as:
p2
p1
=
{
Dwc
i
2(p, w2) δ1 +
[
1−Dwci2(p, w2)
] δ2
δ1
}
Dui(ci2(p, w2))
Dui(ci1(p, w1))
. (14)
This is the generalized Euler equation of Harris and Laibson [5]. It follows from (14)
that date-1 efficiency requires all consumers to have the same marginal propensity to
consume out of date-2 wealth in equilibrium. Proposition 3 shows that this can hold
generically only for the linear consumption functions implied by identical homothetic
preferences. In analogy with the incomplete markets literature (Stiglitz [15], Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis [4]), the intuition is that competitive date-1 consumers do not
internalize the impact of their savings decisions on date-2 and -3 prices, which in turn
affect the decisions of date-2 consumers and therefore the welfare of date-1 consumers.
Identical homothetic preferences ensure that equilibrium prices do not depend on the
distribution of wealth across consumers, and this is what leads to a (constrained) effi-
cient allocation in equilibrium.
5. Concluding remarks
Renegotiation-proofness is a benchmark for efficiency in an economy in which it is not
possible to commit not to renegotiate. One would expect renegotiation-proof alloca-
tions to arise in an environment in which a contract is enforced unless all parties to the
contract agree to re-write it, and in which bargaining is efficient. Our results show that
a sequence of competitive markets need not achieve this benchmark of efficiency. An
interesting open question is whether there are decentralized mechanisms, other than a
complete set of date-1 markets, that do.
We have focussed on exchange economies. The example of Krusell, Kurus¸c¸u,
and Smith [7] shows that the competitive equilibrium in a production economy with
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identical consumers and homothetic preferences can yield a higher level of utility to
consumers at the initial date than does any renegotiation-proof allocation. Thus
renegotiation-proof allocations need no longer be Pareto efficient from the perspec-
tive of consumers at the initial date. Instead, competitive markets generate a form of
commitment that makes these consumers better off than when they have access to effi-
cient centralized bargaining procedures. However, the use of homothetic preferences in
Krusell, Kurus¸c¸u, and Smith [7] rules out the sort of inefficiency of competitive markets
that can occur even in an exchange economy.
A Proof of Proposition 3
Step 1. As defined in (7)–(8), P is parameterized by pairs (e, λ) of aggregate endow-
ments and Pareto weights. It will be more convenient to parameterize P instead using
the vector of aggregate endowments e, together with a feasible allocation ct at one par-
ticular date t. To construct such a parameterization, consider any (et, λ) in R++ ×∆I
and solve the date-t version of (7)–(8) for (et, ct). This defines a function g that maps
R++×∆I onto the set F of strictly positive (et, ct) that satisfy the feasibility constraint
(8). The inverse of this function is given by (et, l(ct)), where:
li(ct) =
[
I∑
j=1
1
Duj(cjt)
]−1
1
Dui(cit)
for each i. One can show that g is a diffeomorphism (see Luttmer and Mariotti [10]).
Fix any t, take a vector (e, ct) such that (et, ct) ∈ F , and define:
(es, cs) = g(es, l(ct))
for s = 1, 2, 3. This defines a map ϕt that takes any point (et, ct, e−t) from Θ = F×R2++
and maps it into P . The fact that g is a diffeomorphism implies that ϕt : Θ→ P is a
diffeomorphism as well. Clearly, Θ is a (I + 2)-dimensional manifold, and so P must
be too. Given aggregate endowments, the manifold of Pareto efficient allocations is, as
expected, of dimension I − 1.
Step 2. Define, for every t:
At =
{
(et, ct, e−t) ∈ Θ :
I∏
i=1
Dsi(cit) = 0
}
,
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Bt =
{
(e, c) ∈ P :
I∏
i=1
Dsi(cit) = 0
}
.
For every t, we have ϕ−1t (Bt) ⊂ At. Assumption Z implies that At has measure zero
in Θ. Since ϕt is a diffeomorphism, it then follows that Bt has measure zero in P , for
every t. Thus, leaving out points from the efficient manifold at which some Dsi(cit)
vanishes amounts to leaving out a set of points that is of measure zero in the efficient
manifold. Intuitively, the fact that ϕt is a diffeomorphism implies that the efficient
manifold has no tangent spaces of the form {(e, c) : cit = 0}. The fact that Bt has
measure zero in P follows naturally from this and Assumption Z.
For each i, let Ci be the set of points where Dsi is not equal to zero, and let
C =
∏I
i=1C
i. Write P∗ = P ∩ (R3++ × C3), and Θ∗ = Θ ∩ (R++ × C × R2++). Since
the Dsi are continuous it follows that C is an open subset of RI++. Similarly, P∗ and
Θ∗ are relatively open subsets of P and Θ, respectively. As a result of Assumption Z,
P∗ differs from P by a closed set of measure zero. For every t, ϕt : Θ∗ → P∗ is again
a diffeomorphism.
Step 3. It turns out that eliminating points from the consumption spaces where some
Dsi vanishes is not enough to prove our genericity result. By focusing on points in
C we can eliminate some additional critical points from the commodity space without
eliminating non-negligible pieces from P . For each i, define ri : R3++ × C3 → R by
ri(e, c) = si(ci2) − si(ci3), and consider the function Ri : Θ∗ → R defined as Ri(θ) =
ri(ϕ1(θ)). We then obtain the following result.
Lemma 1. The function Ri : Θ∗ → R only has regular values.
Proof. Note that DRi(θ) = Dri(e, c)Dϕ1(θ) for (e, c) = ϕ1(θ) and θ = (e1, c1, e−1).
Since c ∈ C whenever θ ∈ Θ∗, Dri(e, c) 6= 0. Consider varying the e−1-component of
θ. Since (e1, c1) is fixed, λ = l(c1) must be fixed. Thus we are to investigate changes
in (ci2, c
i
3) as (e2, e3) varies for fixed λ. Efficiency requires that consumption of all
consumers co-moves strictly with the aggregate. Thus, by varying (e2, e3) in arbitrary
directions, one can vary (ci2, c
i
3) in arbitrary directions. This means that one can find
a linear combination of the columns of Dϕ1(θ) that is not orthogonal to Dr
i(e, c). It
follows that DRi(θ) 6= 0. ¤
13
Recall that Θ∗ is a relatively open subset of Θ, and thus an (I + 2)-dimensional
manifold. Lemma 1 together with the Preimage Theorem implies that the zero set of Ri
is a submanifold of Θ∗ of dimension I+1. The fact that ϕ1 is a diffeomorphism implies
that the image under ϕ1 of this submanifold is a submanifold of P∗ of lower dimension
than P∗. For every i, we can therefore eliminate from P∗ the points (e, c) = ϕ1(θ) that
satisfy Ri(θ) = 0 for some θ ∈ Θ∗. Write P∗∗ for the resulting open subset of P . By
construction, P∗∗ differs from P by a closed set of measure zero, and si(ci2) and si(ci3)
never coincide for any i on P∗∗.
Step 4. We are now ready to complete the proof of Proposition 3. A convenient way
to describe the set of efficient equilibrium allocations defined by (7)–(8) and (12) is
obtained by eliminating the Pareto weights and shadow prices. This gives: Dui(ci2)− φDui(ci1)Dui(ci3)− ψDui(ci2)
D2ui(ci3)− ξD2ui(ci2)
= 0 (15)
for all i, and some (φ, ψ, ξ) ∈ R3++, together with the feasibility conditions:
et −
I∑
i=1
cit = 0 (16)
for all t. Given a vector of aggregate endowments e, we have to solve for the consump-
tion allocation c and (φ, ψ, ξ). Note that (15)–(16) is a system of 3(I+1) equations and
3(I+1) unknowns. Differentiating the left-hand side of (15) with respect to (ci, φ, ψ, ξ)
and scaling the tth row of the derivative by Dui(cit) yields:
[
Ai B
]
=

−D2ui(ci1)
Dui(ci1)
D2ui(ci2)
Dui(ci2)
0 −φ−1 0 0
0 −D2ui(ci2)
Dui(ci2)
D2ui(ci3)
Dui(ci3)
0 −ψ−1 0
0 −D3ui(ci2)
D2ui(ci2)
D3ui(ci3)
D2ui(ci3)
0 0 −ξ−1
,
with obvious notation. The derivative of the left-hand side of (15) and (16) therefore
has the same rank as: 
0 A1 0 · · · 0 B
0 0
. . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . . AI−1 0 B
0 0 · · · 0 AI B
I3 −I3 · · · −I3 −I3 0
. (17)
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Suppose now that we restrict attention to aggregate endowments and allocations in:
W = R3(I+1)++ \(P\P∗∗).
W is an open subset of R3(I+1)++ that differs from R
3(I+1)
++ by a closed set of measure zero.
The determinant of Ai is given by:
D2ui(ci1)
Dui(ci1)
D2ui(ci2)
Dui(ci2)
D2ui(ci3)
Dui(ci3)
[
si(ci3)− si(ci2)
]
.
The strict concavity of ui implies that this is zero if and only if si(ci3) = s
i(ci2). But this
cannot happen on W for any i. Thus all the Ai are non-singular on W , implying that
(17) has full rank. Therefore zero is a regular value of the map defined by the left-hand
sides of (15)–(16). The Transversality Theorem implies that for generic endowments
e, efficient equilibrium allocations c are isolated. This proves Proposition 3.
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